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Giving Content to Our Environmental Moral Obligations to
Future Generations: Why Kyoto is a Fallacy
Mirko Bagaric"
I. INTRODUCTION

The environment is a popular concern. Despite this, it is surprisingly difficult to identify a concrete moral basis for giving weight
to environmental issues. Environmental interventions generally
require the present population to compromise their standard of living to advance the interests of future, and sometimes distant, generations. Why should we indulge less now so that future people can
live better? It is questionable whether the notion of deferred wellbeing or happiness is viable at the individual level, let alone at the
interpersonal or cross-generational level. In this paper I examine
the source and scope of the environmental duty. I place this in the
context of the Kyoto Protocol. I argue that an environmental duty
stems from the 'principle of positive duty'. Despite this, there is no
moral imperative to implement the Kyoto Protocol. The benefits of
the Protocol are too speculative when weighed against the certain
disadvantages.
A. Growing Interest in Environmental Law-Lip Service Only?
Interest in the environment and environmental law has
grown significantly over the past two decades or so. Despite this,
there remains an underlying suspicion that the commitment of
most individuals and nation states to the environment is somewhere between patchy and tokenistic. In principle most people are
committed to the environment and it is undoubtedly a popular concern, but it is questionable whether many of us are prepared to
make meaningful sacrifices for the sake of the environment. This is
underscored at the international level by the reluctance of many
states, including Australia and the United States, to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) on global warning.
BA LLB(Hons), LLM PhD (Monash), Head of Deakin Law School.
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B. Alarmist Views Cause Some Desensitization
This equivocation towards a commitment to environmentally sound practices is understandable for two reasons. The first is
that the science concerning just how much abuse the earth can
handle before the climatic and atmospheric conditions change to a
point where human existence is threatened or made more oppressive is unclear. Additionally, there is considerable evidence suggesting that predictions of impending catastrophes in the next hundred years or so, arising from the greenhouse effect and the ozone
layer have been overstated. The most balanced projections at this
point seem to indicate that current levels of carbon dioxide omissions will cause some damage to the environment, but nothing that
is unmanageable. The world may be slightly warmer in decades to
come, necessitating some lifestyle changes but hardly of the magnitude that will stretch the human capacity to adapt and improvise.
Earlier alarmist predictions, now largely discredited, may have had
a desensitizing effect on many people to the extent that they view
the expression of any environmental concerns as mere hype.
C. Why Should We Care about Distant, Facelessand Future
People?
The other reason that many people are ambivalent about a
commitment to the environment is that the source of a duty to care
for it has not been established. Why should individuals or states
care about the environment? Sure it is possible to coerce people to
engage in environmentally friendly activities (such as recycling
and using less plastic bags) by the use of legal measures but in order to move people and nation states to implement more environmentally sound domestic laws it is important to source the imperative in a clear normative principle. Empirical studies have revealed
that normative issues are closely linked with compliance with the
law. People do not merely obey the law because it is in their selfinterest to do so, but also because they believe it is morally proper
to do so.'

I

See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 107, 175-6 (1990),.
where following a 1984 study of about 1,500 people who lived in Chicago, in
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The issue as to why people ought to care about the environment, despite the significant advances in environmental law,
remains unresolved. To this end, I note that virtually all legal
commentaries on the environment have as their starting point that
we have a duty to care for the environment. This is a matter that
needs to be established, not merely asserted. Ultimately, environmentally friendly behavior requires us to indulge less now so that
other people (often faceless strangers in other parts of the world)
and people that will exist in the future can live better. But why
should we do this? Why do we owe any obligations to people in
other parts of the world or those that are yet to be born? What is
the source of the imperative by which people not yet born can impose constraints on our behavior? Moreover, what is the content of
this obligation?
D. Extinction of Human Species Is Not an Indefensible Moral
Position
A sound argument can be made that we do not owe an obligation to people in distant parts of the world or future generations.
Conferring lifestyle advantages on those people through prudent
environmental practices involves diminishing our quality of life.
All normative theories place a high premium on individual liberty.
This permits people to engage in any practices they wish that do
not directly and demonstrably harm others. At the individual level,
it is rare that environmentally imprudent behavior will tangibly
harm another individual. More typically, it is the collective effect
of generations of unsound practices, such as driving motor vehicles, which lessens the quality of life of future generations. Thus,
individuals can assert, as a causal reality, that it was not their behavior that created the problem.
Moreover, it is not clear that 'others' in the moral equation
includes faceless people in distant parts of the world or unidentifiable people not yet born. Surely, so the argument runs, the sphere
of one's moral concern must have some boundaries-and better to
care for our neighbor by letting him or her utilize copious amounts
asking about their contact with legal authorities, Tyler noted that normative issues are closely linked with compliance with the law.
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of (albeit environmentally harmful) resources rather than trying to
factor distant and future people into our moral reasoning. Our lifestyles and quality of life should not be curtailed by distant others.
As a community we had no choice but to 'take the world as we
found it' and so too should other people and generations. Arguably, the concept of a cross-generational obligation has never previously been seriously touted in human existence and there is no
sound basis for it now.
The incongruity of establishing an obligation to nonneighbors is illustrated by the difficulty in trying to balance the
needs of people in other states against future generations. The
world community could eradicate starvation in the world today if it
increased the amount of food production. The increased energy
consumption required to do this could, however, have detrimental
environmental effects by depleting various stocks of natural resources thereby diminishing the quality of our children's lives.
Whose interests rate more highly in this conflict?
There is no clear answer on whether we should choose to
alleviate the misery of the living at the expense of the interests of
future people. Moreover, there is not even a coherent framework
by which this tension can be resolved. This shows the vacuousness,
it can be argued, of the notion that we owe a duty to nonneighbors.
E. Outline and Objective ofArticle
In this paper I examine whether we are morally obliged to
act in an environmentally sound manner. I argue that there is such
a duty. The most persuasive argument in favor of an environmental
duty stems from the 'maxim of positive duty'. This is the principle
that people have a positive moral duty to act where it would cause
them little inconvenience but constitute a significant benefit to another person. In this regard, 'other people' include strangers and
those not yet born. While at the normative level a case can be made
for an environmental duty, there is a psychological obstacle to this
duty being actioned. It is a pervasive aspect of human nature that
we are more inclined to cure suffering that is proximate to us than
anonymous distant (or potential) suffering. This phenomenon is
referred to as the 'door step' principle. In order to overcome this it
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is necessary to take positive steps to eradicate it from our individual and collective psyches. These issues are examined in section
three of this paper.
In the next section I argue that there is a need to ground a
commitment to the environment in an express moral principle. Despite its contemporary popularity, a commitment to the environment is not self-evident. In part four of the paper I apply the principles propounded in part three to the Kyoto Protocol and examine
whether, as a community, we are morally committed to implementing the treaty. I conclude that no such obligation exists. The benefits to be derived from the Protocol are too speculative and do not
outweigh the certain drawbacks of the Protocol.
II. A MORAL ENVIRONMENTAL DUTY Is NOT SELF-EVIDENT
A. Extinction of Human Species Is Not an Indefensible Moral
Position
The obvious counter to the threshold issue raised in this paper (whether we do in fact have a moral environmental obligation)
is that it is obvious that such an obligation exists. In other words, it
is self-evident that we have an obligation to care for the environment either for its own sake or for the benefit of future generations.
It can be argued that pragmatically, if not logically or morally, we
must accept as a starting point that maintenance of the environment
is important. This is apparent, so the argument runs, from the fact
that denial of such an obligation would have catastrophic and unthinkable consequences. Followed to its logical conclusion, a denial of the existence of an environmental ethic could ultimately
mean the destruction of the world, or at least the extinction of the
human species. Thus it could be asserted that a commitment to the
environment is obvious from the fact that the price of indifference-the possible extinction of the human species-is simply untenable.
However, this reality does not as a normative matter necessarily commit one to growing an environmental sympathy gland.
Mere membership in a particular species (homo sapiens) does not
entitle an agent or group to special rights, such as the right to ongoing survival. Difference in species is not of itself a patently obvi-
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ous morally relevant difference. There is no logical or moral incongruity associated with the sentiment that it does not matter if
the human species, as a result of its glutinous lifestyle, consumes
itself out of existence. 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the de-2
struction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.'
Thousands of plant and animal species become extinct each year.
We are prepared to stand by and accept this, thereby tacitly (at
least) endorsing that extinction is a tolerable phenomenon.
On one level, it can be argued that it matters even less if the
human species becomes extinct. We are the only species that is
aware of the risks involved in engaging in environmentally destructive practices and hence we are culpable for our demise,
should it occur.
In order to possess superior rights or special interests, it is
necessary to identify what in particular it is about humans that
make us so special. Other animals have many features in common
with humans: they live, think, feel, and so on, and some animals
even have higher cognitive functions than seriously disabled or
young people. Something more than mere membership in the privileged class is necessary morally to justify the special position we
enjoy. Without identifying this something more, the bias towards
homo sapiens appears to be arbitrary, in the same way as it is arbitrary to discriminate between different groups, such as black and
white people, within the same race. Philosophers have attempted
throughout the ages to give a higher ranking to humans in the 'ethical food chain' by resorting to qualities such as dignity, which are
supposedly possessed only by humans. Such attempts have met
with little success.
B. Humans as Special Is Perhapsa Self-Serving Belief-Dogs and
Pigs Would Probably 'Say' the Same
As individuals, empirical evidence shows that we tend to
overrate our sense of worth.3 The claim that human beings are spe2

For a good account of Hume's theory see MICHAEL

SMITH,

Valuing:

Desiring or Believing? in REDUCTION, EXPLANATION AND REALISM 323 (D.
Charles & C. Lennon eds., Clarendon Press, 1992) and Realism in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 399, 400-2 (P. Singer ed. Blackwell, 1991).
3

DAVID G. MYERS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 110-111 (1992).
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cial could simply be the ultimate self-serving 'beat-up', which continues to be uncritically perpetuated simply because those who
have an interest to speak against it (i.e. non-humans) have no
voice. In this regard there are two salient points which need to be
mentioned. First, saying something (no matter how frequently)
does not make it so. The wildly held belief that the world was flat
did not result in the flattening of the spherical earth, and dogmatism, regarding the existence of witches and unicorns, has not led
to confirmed sightings of such creatures-at least not yet. Secondly, dogs, pigs and most other animals seem to prefer their own
company and, if polled, would probably also assert their species'
specialness.
One should not, it can be argued, lament if in the end the
collective outcome of human gluttony is that we gorge ourselves
out of existence. This is especially true, given that we have the intelligence that allows us to foresee the likely consequences of our
glutinous existence. The notion of personal responsibility plays an
important role irrespective of which of the mainstream normative
ethical theory one subscribes to. Collectively, we cannot avoid the
application of this concept. Moreover, as a general rule, we endorse the view that creatures which cause environmental damage
should be exterminated. There is of course no greater environmental vandal than the human race.
It is important to emphasize that in this paper I am ignoring
the interests of animals in the moral environmental equation. This
is not because their interests do not count. In fact one of us has
previously argued that humanity's shabby treatment of animals
will be the shame of the current generation.4 I do not consider animal interests because pragmatically I do not believe that an environmental ethic founded, even in part, on animal interests will create a change in human attitudes or behavior-history shows we
care very little for animals.
Thus, an environmental duty must be established, not
merely asserted. It is to this that I now turn.

Mirko Bagaric & Keith Akers, No Absence of Malice Towards the Gallus - Animal Cruelty: The Shame of a Generation, 18 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 505
(2001).
4
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III. GROUNDING A MORAL ENVIRONMENTAL DUTY
A. Sometimes We Have a Duty to Assist Others
As noted above, despite its popular appeal, there is no

ready rationale which places the environment on the ethical radar.
However, there is one principle which pervades most moral theories and, when fully explored, can at least ground a modest environmental obligation.
The main counter to the argument that we have a moral environmental duty is the argument from personal liberty-we can
do as we wish so long as we do not directly harm others.
Legally, this view is reflected in the acts and omissions
doctrine. The acts and omissions doctrine has won widespread appeal largely due to the claim that it prevents our lives being intolerably burdened by demarcating the extent to which we must help
others. It is the reason that we do not feel obliged to devote more
resources to assisting people who are worse off than us, and why
we feel less responsible for the deaths and tragedies we fail to prevent than for those we directly cause. The doctrine is one source of
justification for why failing to feed the starving people in other nations is not on par to shooting our neighbor. 5 Despite their intuitive
appeal, the acts and omissions doctrine and the notion of personal
liberty are not inviolable.
Morality makes very few positive demands of us. It is essentially a set of negatively framed rules proscribing certain behavior. However, it is premature to conclude that so long as we do not
violate these negative rules we have discharged our moral obligations. There are occasions when acting morally requires us to do
more than merely refraining from certain behavior; where we must
actually do something. Morality defined exhaustively as a set of
negative proscriptions fails to explain why it is morally repugnant
for Bill Gates to refuse to give his loose change to the starving
peasant whose path he crosses, or why it is wrong to decline to
save a child drowning in a puddle in order to avoid getting our

3

See HELGA KUHSE, 'Euthanasia' in Peter Singer (ed), A COMPANION

TO ETHICS (1991) 297.
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shoes wet, or to refuse to throw a life rope to the person drowning
beside the pier.
B. Content of the Maxim of Positive Duty
While the situations in which morality demands performance of a positive action are infrequent, when they do arise the obligations can be so clear, pronounced and unwavering that it would
be implausible to postulate an account of morality which is not
consistent with and explicable to such observations. As is discussed below, in addition to the negative postulates of morality,
there is one very important positive one: we must assist others in
serious trouble when assistance would immensely help them at little or no inconvenience to ourselves6 -the maxim of positive
duty. 7 The flip side of this maxim is that we should not engage in
conduct which will have seriously set back the interests of others
where this will only confer a minor benefit on ourselves.
The acts and omissions doctrine is incapable of explaining
why we are understandably appalled on becoming aware of clear
breaches of this maxim. The public loathing directed at the witnesses of the Kitty Genovese murder is a practical illustration of
the operation of the maxim. 8 Whether harm ensues as a result of an
act or omission is in itself irrelevant to the moral appraisal of an
action. The critical issue is whether one is responsible for the
harm, where responsibility is assessed from the perspective of all

6

There are some who would deny that any such duty exists, for example,

see EDWARD

MARK,

'Bad Samaritans and the Causation of Harm' (1980) PHI-

LOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1. However I agree with JOHN HARRIS in THE
VALUE OF LIFE (1987) 31 who labels the denial of such a duty as 'very odd'.

This is explored further in Mirko Bagaric, 'A Utilitarian Argument:
laying the foundation for a coherent system of law' (2002) 10 OTAGO LAW RE7

VIEW 163; and KUMAR AMARASEKARA & MIRKO BAGARIC, EUTHANASIA, MORALITY AND THE LAW (2002).

8

Kitty was beaten and stabbed by her assailant in Kew Gardens, Queens,

New York City, over a 35 minute period in front of 38 'normal' law abiding
citizens who did nothing to assist her; not even call the police, or yell at the offender. When finally a 70 year old woman called the police it took them only
two minutes to arrive, but by this time Kitty was already dead: LOUIS P POJMAN,
ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG (1990) 1-2.
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of the norms and rules of morality including the maxim of positive
duty.
Arguably, the principle of positive duty provides a far more
accurate and coherent basis upon which we can reject intolerable
demands on our time and resources than the acts and omissions
doctrine. The doctrine is not necessary to explain why we should
not work solely to assist others, since there is simply no preexisting moral obligation to help everyone we possibly can. Morality is essentially a set of negative constraints plus the maxim of
positive duty. 9 The proviso to the maxim, when there is little or no
inconvenience to oneself, readily explains why our duty to assist
others is limited.
This maxim ties in neatly with environmental ethics. It explains why we are required to make some sacrifices for other people, even in distant parts of the world, but need not be 'slaves' to
them by depriving ourselves of an adequate quality of life. It is important to note that, as is discussed below, our non-neighbors are
included in this principle by virtue of the fact that there is no logical or normative basis for ranking the interests of one person
higher than another.' 0 Thus, we should not engage in activities
which damage the environment where this will have a disproportionate adverse affect on others, no matter where they are located.
It is, however, not so easy to make a case for caring about the interests of people not yet born. The problems of justifying an obligation to future generations have bemused philosophers over the
ages. "1
Future people do not have the capacity to feel pain; they
have no interests; and arguably should be ignored in our moral calMirko Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument: Laying the Foundation for a
Coherent System ofLaw, 10 OTAGO L. REv. 163 (2002).
10
Id.
II
It has many parallels with the issue of whether one owes a duty to the

9

dead. For the views of others regarding the duty to future generations, interested
readers might consider Bernard E. Rollin, Environmental Ethics and International Justice, in, PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 124 (Steven LuperFoy ed., 1988); Richard T. DeGeorge, Do We Owe the Future Anything?, in

LAW AND THE ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 180 (Eugene E. Dais ed.,

1978); and James P. Sterba, The Welfare Rights of Distant Peoples and Future
Generations. Moral Side-Constraints on Social Policy, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
1, 99 (1981).
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culations. In a similar vein, Richard T. De George has noted that
only existing entities have rights because what is non-existent cannot be the subject or bearer of anything. 'Just as non-existent entities have no rights so it makes no sense to sp.eak about anyone's
correlative duty towards non-existent entities'.' 2
Also, as noted earlier, there is no intrinsic harm stemming
from the extinction of the human species. The species is simply an
aggregation of the interests of each individual and as I have noted,
future people have 'zero' interests-a billion times zero is still
zero. This analysis would make for a very limited form of environmental obligation, whereby our concern ended at about the anticipated expiry of our lives.
C. GenerationalLayering Groundinga Concernfor the
Environment
While there is no intrinsic worth in promulgating the existence of the human species, future people can secure some moral
concern in a derivative manner by way of the constant layering of
generations. To speak of particular generations of people as occupying the earth at any one time is simplistic to the point of being
misleading. At any point in time the cross-section of ages of people
occupying the earth ranges from the new born to centurians. It is
never the case that one generation dies off and is immediately replaced by another. There is a constant layering of generations. It is
this layering phenomenon that provides the key to a commitment
to people who will live beyond the date of one's death.
As individuals we have rights and broader interests (including that stemming from the operation of maxim of positive duty)
that we can assert against other individuals and society as a whole.
While the content of these rights is of course highly controversial,
and none are absolute, at the core there are certain noncontroversial rights and interests. These include the right to life
and liberty. These rights impose correlative duties on others, that
is, not to kill and imprison us, and we in turn assume these duties
to others. These duties and responsibilities are assumed by each of
us toward all other individuals, no matter where they are situated
12

De George, supra 11.
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and irrespective of their age (subject to the exception that minors
do not have moral duties). Thus, the maxim of positive duty locks
in the twenty year old vis-A-vis the eighty year old, in the same
way as it does the ninety year old vis-A-vis the new born.' 3
Given that the life span of each new born may tenably be
80-100 years and that each new born has interests, and these minimally include a desire to live a 'full' life and enjoy some semblance of human flourishing, we should not engage in environmentally destructive practices which are likely to impair other people
realizing these goals. However, individuals do not have a duty to
refrain from engaging in activities that may result in environmental
damage beyond the expected life span of those with whom they
share the earth. Thus, the scope of our environmental duty (on the
basis of current human longevity expectations) is capped at about
100 years. This of course will not cease in 2105. It will continue
into perpetuity, but only 100 years at a time.
Against this background, I evaluate the desirability of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. But before doing so, I first discuss the
leading pragmatic obstacle to the global community adopting a serious commitment to the maxim of positive duty and the environment.
D. The Door Step Principle
1. We Take Far More Interest in Those Immediately before Us
In order for the maxim of positive duty to have a practical
effect it is necessary to address and discard the 'door step phenomenon'. This is the widely held view that proximate suffering
matters more than anonymous distant suffering. The fact that we
are reluctant to advance the interests of our non-neighbors does not
have a normative foundation, but is simply an aspect of how humans seem to be built. We are moved far more by immediate
events rather than remote ones. As people, we are driven to far
greater lengths to assist those whose suffering we are directly confronted with than those whom we can choose to ignore. Immediate
13

The relationship is not a complete equivalence given that minors do not

have moral responsibilities.
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lives weigh far more heavily on the sympathy scale than distant
ones. As an empirical fact, we seem to be built in such a way that
when an identifiable individual is experiencing pain and suffering
(or is in need of help) this impacts on us much more heavily than
when it is experienced by faceless strangers. Thus, in 1995, the
Australian Government spent $5.8 million rescuing French sailor
labelle Autissier who was stranded while on a solo frolic around
the world, when the same money could have saved thousands of
starving people around the world.
2. Ignoring the Interests of Our Non-Neighbors is Unjustified
It is not putting the point too strongly to suggest that every
adult in the first world is aware that every minute of the day people
are dying in distant parts of the world due to readily preventable
causes. The fleeting glimpse of starving children on the evening
news evokes some sense of sympathy, guilt or responsibility. Unfortunately, we are too good at escaping these feelings-we need
to be educated to hold onto them. The limits of personal and state
responsibility are not exhausted by our capacity to successfully
block out 'distant' human suffering. 'Nothing justifies valuing one
life ahead of another'.' 4
Peter Singer, Nothing justifies valuing one life ahead of another, THE
AGE (Melbourne), 1 April 2003, at 17. The counter to the doorstep argument is
that the emotional impulse to feel strongly only towards those we are confronted
with is so strong that it is unchangeable. This is not persuasive. This response
can be changed, but only if it is identified. The contemporary view of human
emotions is that we are capable of assuming considerable control over our emotions. We actually do have a meaningful level of choice regarding the depth of
our emotions-even though there are certain stimuli that are invariably likely to
make us happy, sad, disappointed or angry-and even more so how emotions
are manifested in our behavior. Following a comprehensive examination of the
leading theories of emotion, William Lyons in Emotion (1980) states that emotions stem from a four-part process. First, there must be an object or stimulus.
This can take the form of an infinite number of things, including material
(physical) objects and intentional objects (the objects of our mental states). Once
a stimulus has occurred the agent then forms a belief about the object. The agent
then evaluates the object according to that belief. Once the evaluation has been
made an emotion may then follow. In short, the process is: (i) object, (ii) belief
about the object, (iii) evaluation, and (iv) emotion. Then there is, of course, the
behavior that results from the emotion. The critical point to note here is that
14
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There is no basis for acting in this way. Each person ranks
equally in any moral hierarchy. There is simply no logical basis for
ranking one person's happiness more highly than that of the next
person. Further, an attempt to do otherwise would be futile. The
efficacy of morality is contingent on widespread support. People
seem to have a strong tendency to act on the basis of reciprocity.
People who have their interests disregarded or undervalued are less
likely to observe the interests of others. 15 If the happiness of certain individuals or a group is put above the rest of the community,
there simply will not be enough participants in the moral game to
attain individual happiness.
The door step principle explains why first world countries
have, despite an overt commitment to human rights and the equalemotions are not reflexive events. They are not things that simply happen to us:
we have significant input into their development. On the basis of the model of
emotion developed by Lyons, it is possible to not only avoid the development of
some emotions, but one can 'also exercise control over one's emotions on occasion by deliberately aborting them once they have taken root': 197. Given our
capacity to control our emotions and the behavior stemming from them, people

are blameworthy for inducing in themselves an emotional state (even if the emotion is one we usually approve of) where it can be foreseen that such an emotional state will lead to undesirable consequences: at 203. Moreover, excessive
displays of emotion may be deemed blameworthy: 'if the occurrence of emotional states makes acting on the motives inherent in such emotional states more
likely, then deliberately to abandon oneself to an emotional state could be deliberately to abandon what control one does have over one's emotional behavior.
When angry, for example, one might feel like indulging in physical violence,
which usually turns out to be morally reprehensible. Now, if one fosters anger,
savoring the outraged feelings and aggressive impulses, knowing that one normally acts on them quite impulsively, one can be said to be deliberately loosening one's aggressive impulses. If something morally undesirable does then result
from my fit of anger, I can be blamed, not merely for not controlling my anger,
but for deliberately putting myself into a position which I knew from previous
experience would lead to uncontrollable behavior .... Now, of course, one need
not have fostered or induced an emotion to incur blame for its undesirable consequences. It may just be a strong emotion in any case, with unfortunate effects,
in which case one may deserve blame for failing to try to quell the emotion and
curb the behavior stemming from it': at 205.
is
Evidence of this is the grossly disproportionate number of people from
deprived social backgrounds in prison. For a discussion about the role of reciprocity see Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV.
BIOLOGY 35 (197 1); and ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984).
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ity of the human species, been spectacularly successful in ignoring
the plight of desperate people in third world countries. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) recently
published its Human Development Report 2003 showing that many
of the world's people continue to live in poverty.' 6 The Report is
based on the Millennium Declaration which was adopted in September 2000 by 189 countries and involves eight goals-ranging
from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS
to enrolling all children in primary school by 2015. Despite commitments in principle by governments, aid agencies and civil society organizations everywhere, in practice the world is falling short
of achieving the goals set. ' 7 According to the Human Development
Report, more than 50 nations grew poorer over the past decade.
Many are seeing life expectancy plummet due to HIV/AIDS. Some
of the worst performers (often torn by conflict) are seeing school
enrolments shrink and access to basic health care fall. And nearly
everywhere the environment is deteriorating'. 18
The failure to meet such targets is nothing new. The global
community, often led by the United Nations, has set many development goals and has failed to reach them. For example, at the
1990 Summit on Children the world committed to universal primary education by 2000. This has not been achieved.19 Further, in
the Alma Ata Declaration of 1977, the world committed to health
care for all people by the end of the century yet 'every day more
than 30,000 children around the world die of preventable diseases,
and about 14,000 people per day are infected with HIV[.] It is possible to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; we know
how to do
20
it and we can afford it, but we lack the commitment'.
Thus, it is undeniable that many of the world's people continue to suffer-and in large numbers. As noted above, poverty is a
major cause: 'about 2.8 billion people still live on less than $2 a
16

Human Development Report 2003: Millenium Development Goals: A

Compact Imong Nations to End Human Poverty (United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP)) 2003.
17

Id. at v.
Id.
19
Id. at 29-30.
20
Ivan Simonovic, Relative Sovereignty of the Twenty First Century,
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 380 (2002).
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day and the richest one percent of the world's people receive as
much income each year as fifty-seven of the poorest'. 2 1 Moreover,
armed conflict and internal strife have not abated. 'The 1999 genocide in Rwanda ... left some 800,000. .. murdered in 100 days'
while 'France armed and diplomatically defended the genocidal
government'. 22 Further, it has been estimated that during the twentieth century, governments killed 170 million of their own citizens.
This number is greater than the total number of people killed in
wars between states, including two 'world wars'. 2 In essence, the
picture to emerge is that the gap between the rich and poor nations
continues to grow, with the result being that many of the world's
citizens do not enjoy the most basic of amenities that are required
for subsistence, let alone the opportunity to flourish. Today, despite the popularity of human rights at the discussion level, the
fight for gender equality continues; unemployment and poverty are
increasing; people are dying of hunger and illness everyday, and
the right to asylum is being questioned. Although the ideal set out
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains, the reality
24
is very different.
3. Debunking the Door-Step Principle in a High Order Priority
In order for environmental ethics to advance and have the
opportunity to realize its aims, it is necessary to debunk the doorstep principle and to adopt the maxim of positive duty. It is only
21

Id.

22

SAMANTHA POWER, THE NEW KILLING FIELDS (2002).

23

Simonovic, supra 20, at 376.
UNESCO, Are Human Rights Merely a Nice Idea?, at

24

http://www.dadalos.org/int/Menschenrechte/grundkursrnr5/
grundk_5.htm#Text2 (last visited Mar. 11, 2005). At the time of writing this
paper (June 2004) the government in Sudan (through its agents the Janjaweed
militia) was in the process of slaughtering and driving out thousands of members
of the Zaghawa, Masalit and Fur tribes in the Dafur region of Sudan. It is estimated by the US Agency for International Development that 320,000 people
will be killed this year. And the response by the UN and the US is to 'explor[e]
whether to describe the mass murder and rape.., as genocide'. For Kristof, if
this situation does not constitute 'genocide', then the word has no meaning:
Nicholas Kristof, This is Genocide. And it is HappeningNOW, THE AGE (Mel-

bourne), June 18, 2004, at 15.
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after this occurs that genuine moral pressure can be placed on individuals and nation states to engage in constructive and principled
environmental planning and behavior. Eliminating the door step
principle from our collective psyche is admittedly not likely to be
an easy matter. However, as with any reform the first step to progress is identification of
a problem. The next is raising awareness
25
followed by education.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION: SHOULD WE RATIFY THE KYOTO
TREATY?

A. Overview of the Kyoto Treaty
1. Overview
The Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in December 1997 as an international instrument for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 26 The Protocol requires developed countries
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2%
below 1990 levels by 2012. Flexible mechanisms, including emissions trading, can be used to reach these targets. Developing countries are excluded from the targets as a concession to their developing status and minimal contribution to greenhouse gas emissions in
the past.
2. Recently entered into Force
In order for the Protocol to enter into force, two conditions
must be met. First, not less than 55 countries must ratify the treaty.
25

In this paper, I hope to have gone some way down the first two steps.

26

The Kyoto Protocol is an instrument connected to an existing global

climate treaty adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Article 2 of the
FCCC states that its ultimate objective is to 'achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [man-made] interference with the climate system.' United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1171 U.N.T.S. 107,
115.
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Secondly, the parties which ratify the Protocol need to incorporate
states which cumulatively account for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions.
The first requirement was readily satisfied. However, for
several years implementation stalled at the second hurdle. Most of
the 120 plus nations that readily ratified the Protocol were developing nations with low levels of carbon dioxide emissions, which accounted for approximately 40% of the total carbon dioxide emissions.
The Protocol finally entered into force on February 16,
2005, following its ratification by Russia on 18 November 2004.
At the time of writing this paper, over 150 countries had ratified
the Protocol. Key abstainers from the Protocol remain the United
States and Australia.
3. Adverse Economic Effects
The opposition to the Protocol expressed by the United
States is particularly disabling, given that it is the largest producer
of greenhouse gases in the world, accounting for nearly 25%. In
1997 the US Senate unanimously passed a resolution that affirmed
that it would not ratify any global climate treaty that would harm
the United States economy. 7 A report by the American Council
for Capital Formation Center states that loss of productivity in the
United States following implementation of the Protocol would be
between US$120 billion to $400 billion in the time from 2001 to
2010. Gross domestic product per household would reduce between US$1,950 to $3,750. There would also be considerable job
losses-somewhere in the range of 2.4 million. The cost of elecChristopher C Joyner, Burning InternationalBridges, Fuelling Global
Discontent: the United States and Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol,33 VICTORIA
U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 2 (2002). For a discussion regarding the merits of the
Protocol and the politics surrounding its implementations see the special edition
of the U. NEW S. WALES L. J. (2001): Steven Freeland, The Kyoto Protocol:An
Agreement without a Future?,U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 35 (2001); Martijn
Wilder, The Kyoto ProtocolAnd Early Action, U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 39
(2001); Laura Horn, The Kyoto Protocol:Australia's Commitment And Compliance, U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 43 (2001); Gregory Rose, A ComplianceSystem
For The Kyoto Protocol,U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 45 (2001); and William Hare,
AUSTRALIA AND KYOTO: IN OR OUT? U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 38 (2001).
27
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tricity could increase by up to 85%. Gas prices could rise up to
55%, while natural gas would increase by over 120% and living
standards would drop by 15%.28
4. Questionable Science
More relevant, for the purpose of this paper, is the US objection that the science underpinning the Protocol was flawed. As
mentioned earlier, the principal aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce global warming, which it is feared will occur if positive steps
are not taken to curtail the burning of fossil fuels. The science behind this supposed link between burning fossil fuels and global
warning is complex. In brief, burning fossil fuels has caused a
large increase in the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The surface of the earth is warmed by heat from the sun.
Normally about 70% of this heat is reflected back into space. Increased greenhouse gases result in more heat being retained in the
atmosphere and hence a rise in global temperatures. So the theory
goes.
This obviously raises a number of issues. Even if the unfettered use of fossil fuels will raise world temperatures, why should
we care? World temperatures have always fluctuated from year to
year and human flourishing has not been seriously retarded, let
alone threatened. Where is the evidence that the current world
temperature levels are optimal?
Environmental scientists have forecast impending catastrophes if carbon dioxide emissions are not curtailed. Typical of these
forecasts are reports by the United Nations' Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Its 2001 report predicted a range
of catastrophes, ranging from coastal floods, increased droughts,
more crop failures and a higher rate of mosquito-borne diseases if
global warning was not halted.29 In its 1995 assessment report the
IPCC stated that temperature increases by the year 2100 could

A United States Perspective on the Economic Impact of Climate ChangePolicy, AM. COUNCIL CAP. FORMATION CENTER (2000)
(cited in Joyner, supra note 27).
The report is discussed by Joyner, supra 27.
28
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range from less than two degrees Fahrenheit to more than six degrees Fahrenheit.
5. This Is Supported by More Recent Evidence.
For the United States the National Climatic Data
Center has calculated that the average national temperature for November 2001 [through] January
2002 was 39.94 degrees Fahrenheit, 4.3 degrees
above the 1895-2002 average. Globally, the World
Meteorological Organization calculated that 2001
was the second warmest year on Earth since 1860,
when systematic record-keeping began. Nine of the
ten warmest years have occurred since 1990, the
warmest being 1998. The next two warmest were
2001 and 1997, respectively. More ominously, recent events in the polar south have clearly indicated
major disruptions in the local environment. In
March 2002, a 3,250 square kilometer area of ice
estimated to weigh 500 billion tons broke off the
Antarctic continent's Larsen B ice shelf. This collapse is believed to have dumped into the Southern
Ocean more ice than all the other icebergs since
1950 combined. Moreover, a second monster iceberg has been detected as being in the process of
breaking off the Southern Admunsen Sea. Iceberg
B22, as it is called, is more than 64 kilometers (40
miles) wide and 85 kilometers (53 miles) long, and
covers an area approximating 5,500 square kilometers. The belief by scientists is that such ice retreats
are attributed to global warming in the region, particularly around the Antarctic Peninsula. As the circumpolar waters warm, the ice sheets fracture, and
collapse. As the ice shelves collapse, and the ice
melts, sea levels will rise. Of greatest concern is the
Western Antarctic Ice Sheet, which is grounded on
muddy ocean floor, not a solid subglacial continental rock foundation. Should the entire West Antarctic Ice Sheet melt, sea levels worldwide could rise
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five to six meters. In the past, sea level rise attributed to global warming has been more theoretical
speculation than scientific fact. The recent collapse
of these ice shelves in Antarctica clearly suggests
that greenhouse-induced global warming may be
taking a real toll in the first years of the twenty-first
century.30
However, considerable doubt has been cast over the credibility of
global1 warning, let alone the doomsday predictions associated with
3
this.
Professor S. F. Singer notes that the Kyoto Protocol has
caused the polarization: 'Many on the right have called it economic
madness, while for many on the left it is an ecological article of
faith. There seems to be no position in between'. 32 He highlights
potential serious deficiencies with the protocol:
The requirement imposed by Kyoto ...does nothing to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of
greenhouse gases. At best, Kyoto would merely
slow down somewhat the rate of rise, which by the
year 2020 will be largely determined by emissions
from major developing countries like China, India,
Brazil, and Mexico-none of which are covered by
the accord.
The Kyoto Protocol's main emphasis is on carbon
dioxide produced by burning fossil fuels. By contrast, the powerful greenhouse gas methane is barely
mentioned-perhaps because its main sources,
while human-related, are "natural": rice agriculture
and cattle-raising. Furthermore, the Protocol does
30

Id.

The UN IPCC s Artful Bias: GlaringOmissions, False
Confidence and Misleading Statistics in the Summary for Policymakers, ENERGY & ENV'T 13 (3) (2002)
32
S.F. Singer, Climate Change and Global'Warming.Kyoto: A Post Mortem, A Better Earth, at http://www.abetterearth.org/article.php/683.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2005).
31
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not mention other factors that affect the climate,
such as sulfate aerosols from coal-fired power
plants, soot from diesel engines, and smoke from
the burning of biomass (mostly in developing countries).3 3

33

Id. S.F. Singer states that ultimately Kyoto is based on faulty science.

'The Kyoto Protocol, therefore, would have practically no impact on global
temperatures. Even if punctiliously adhered to, it would reduce the calculated
temperature rise by 0.05 degrees Celsius at most-an amount so insignificant it
can hardly be measured. When confronted with that little-publicized fact, supporters of the Protocol admit that Kyoto is intended only as a first step, and that
greenhouse gases will someday have to be further reduced by between 60 and 80
percent of 1990 emission levels. This fact, too, has not been much publicized by
Kyoto's supporters, and with good reason: such drastic reductions would cripple
the global economy. To understand the flaws of the Kyoto Protocol, it is necessary to look first at the climate science that supposedly provides a rationale for
its provisions. Kyoto is not the first attempt to impose worldwide restrictions on
anthropogenic emissions. In many ways, it is patterned after the 1987 Montreal
Protocol, which limited and eventually eliminated the emission of chlorofluorocarbons (known as CFCs, or "Freons") in order "to save the ozone layer." By
1988, environmental pressure groups were already arguing for similar restrictions on the emission of carbon dioxide "to save the climate." As in the case of
the Montreal Protocol, the groundwork for Kyoto was laid by a series of studies
conducted by a U.N.-appointed group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). Its first report was issued in 1990 and suggested that if the concentration of greenhouse gases were to double, a global warming of between 1.5
and 4.5 degrees Celsius would follow. Those numbers were based on crude climate models whose validity had never been tested by observations-and even
today, there remains no validation for the climate models that are at the heart of
most claims of climate catastrophe. The IPCC maintained, however, that the
model results were "broadly consistent" with observations. This claim referred
to a warming trend that had begun in the late nineteenth century and continued
until about 1940. That trend actually had little to do with greenhouse effects but
seems to have been simply a natural fluctuation of the climate, a recovery from
the preceding "Little Ice Age." Driving this point home, the global climate
cooled after 1940 until about 1975-in spite of the copious emission of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the industrial boom years after World
War II. By the 1970s, the persistent cooling trend had become a hot topic, so to
speak, for magazines and books that fretted about a coming Ice Age, and the
federal government supported studies that calculated the economic disasters
expected from a colder climate'. Similar conclusions are made by Patrick J
Michaels, The Consequences of Kyoto
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-307es.html.
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A large number of other independent reviews have also
been critical of the IPCC report. The Director of the Environmental
Program at the Reason Public Policy Institute, Dr. Kenneth Green,
for example, claims the report to be flawed on the basis that it presents what is mere speculation as fact. He argues that the report
makes predictions based on simple models that fail to take into account observed, current or historical climate phenomena and processes, and that it projects an 'appearance' of certainty not supported by tested evidence. 34 According to Green, the report fails to
distinguish between causative factors that are anthropocentric in
origin and those that are not.35 He claims that by failing to distinguish between predictions based on human and non-human factors,
the report does not contain the sort of verifiable information on the
basis of which informed policy decisions about possible future
climate change can be made. 36 Green also criticizes the report for
containing predictions based on a number of overly pessimistic and
unsubstantiated assumptions. 37 Green concludes that until a consensus based on sound science can be reached, it would be irresponsible for
the U.S. government to agree to mandatory emissions
38
reductions.
B. Maxim of Positive Duty Applied to Kyoto Treaty
1. Uncertainties Abound
The overwhelming point to emerge from the, albeit brief,
discussion above is the high level of uncertainty associated with
even the fundamental premises underpinning the Kyoto Protocol.
The weight of evidence seems to suggest that that world is getting
slightly warmer. However, the extent to which this stems from
34

Kenneth Green, Newest IPCCReport on Global Warming Fails to De-

liver Sound Policymaking Models, Reason Public Policy Institute (2001), at
http://www.rppi.org/rrl01.html.
35
Id. at 3.
36
Id. at 5.
37
Id. at 4-5.
38
The above account of the report by Green is taken from Charli E Coon,
Why PresidentBush Is Right to Abandon the Kyoto Protocol,The Heritage
Foundation (2001), at http://www.heritage.org/Researchl EnergyandEnvironment/BG1437.cfm.
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human activity is unclear. The rate of temperature increase seems
modest-just how modest is unclear. Even vaguer are what the
likely consequences of a temperature increase on human flourishing will be. There is no firm evidence suggesting that, in our lifetime, it will mean anything more than an enhanced capacity to get
a good or (if one prioritizes health over aesthetics) bad suntan and
an extension of the summer wardrobe period. There is some evidence that implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will result in a
slight reduction in the standard of living in developed nations.
2. Let Us Enjoy for Now-There Is No Reason That Future People
Should Have Better Lives
Faced with this scenario, some commentators have advised
us to tread wearily and adopt the precautionary principle of international environmental law.' 9 However, applying the precautionary
principle in such circumstances would be 'code' for not doing anything, it is not assured that there will detrimental consequences
down the track that entrench a value system whereby the interests
of others are more important than that of our own. While we have a
duty not to inhibit people, with whom we share the earth, from
having a meaningful life, we do not owe it to others to ensure that
40
they have a better or even equal standard of living to our own.
There is no moral principle that requires us to make martyrs of
ourselves-or our children or their children. Paradoxically, this is a
point from which our children (and their children) will in fact take
considerable delight: It means that, when it is time for them to discharge their moral responsibilities, they too will be able to do so,
consistent with the maxim of positive duty or the demands of the
natural law and apply their talents and resources to the fullest extent possible.
See e.g. Joyner, supra 27. According to Joyner, the precautionary approach advocates that governments should not use the fact that absolute scientific certainty regarding the adverse environmental effects of activities to postpone putting in place measures to prevent those effects. This strategy requires
that risk avoidance becomes an established decision norm, i.e. that in the face of
risks and scientific uncertainties, we must act as if there were complete scientific
39

certainty.
40

The same point is made by De George, supra 11.
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3. Certainties Count for More than Guesses
Moreover, the precautionary principle, applied in the context of the Kyoto Protocol, runs foul of the principle that certain
consequences should always carry more weight in one's decision
making than speculative consequences. This is particularly apposite, as in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, where the worst case
scenario is manageable and the prospect of it eventuating is very
small. In such circumstances it would be a mistake to encumber
our standard of living.
Thus, it is clear that the maxim of positive duty does not
require us to implement the Kyoto Protocol. There is simply insufficient evidence to suggest that a person alive today will have his
or her interests seriously set back if the Protocol is not implemented. Absent such evidence, the calculus involved in applying
the maxim does not even commence.
V. CONCLUSION

A commitment to the environment is normally assumed,
rather than established, in most commentaries on environmental
law. This is regrettable. Absent a framework concerning the source
and scope of our environmental duty, it is likely that unsound environmental policies and laws will be implemented. The Kyoto Protocol is an example of ill-conceived environmental policy, which
has blossomed in part by the lack of normative analysis of its merits.
The strongest rationale in favor of protecting the interests
of future generations stems from the maxim of positive duty. Application of this principle does not require us to implement measures such as the Kyoto Protocol which, current evidence suggests,
is likely to have only a slight adverse effect on the interests of others.

